This research examines the effect of board characteristics (comprising in different sized proportions: family commissioners, family directors, independent commissioners, ex-government officer commissioners, and board of commissioners size) to firm performance. Using fixedeffects data panel regression, this research investigates 293 firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange during 2008-2012. Firm performance is proxied by market measure (Tobin's Q) and accounting measure (ROA). The findings of this research suggest that the proportion of family commissioners and family directors have positive impact only to Tobin's Q value, while the proportion of independent directors can increase both Tobin's Q and ROA. On the other hand, this research finds that the proportion of ex-government officers in the board gives no impact to firm performance. This research also finds that the board size has U-shaped non-linear relationship with firm performance as proxied by Tobin's Q and ROA.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance issue has been an interesting topic for the last decade especially for researchers. This weak corporate governance has been cited as one of the causes of East Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 (Mitton, 2002) . Weak law enforcement and weak protection for minority shareholders in Asian countries also stimulate how the agency problem increases during crisis.
The managers or the majority shareholders who control the firm's assets are able to shift the assets for personal use or invest in unprofitable projects, and in the end expropriating the minority shareholders' wealth (Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; Lemmon & Lins, 2003) . Studies vol. VIII no. 03 (2015 -2016 monitoring function (board of commissioners) in dealing with the agency problems of the company (Lefort & Urzúa, 2008) .
In Indonesia, it is common that family members serve as directors or commissioners. The absence of clear separation between ownership and management, may cause the company to run in accordance with the interest of the controlling shareholder, and not in the company's real interest. In addition, the board of commissioners who are supposed to monitor, control, and advise, may not be able to act independently. A sizeable proportion of family members in the board of commissioners is proven to have a negative impact towards corporate transparency (Saiful, Phua, & Haron, 2012) .
The extent of control from the controlling shareholder can be neutralized by the presence of an independent monitoring board (independent commissioner). Independent commissioners are expected to protect minority shareholders from wealth expropriation by majority shareholders.
The interests of minority shareholders are best protected when they have "power" in facing the ones in control of the company, through independent commissioners (Anderson & Reeb, 2004) . Prabowo and Simpson (2011) in their research in Indonesia found that the presence of independent commissioners has an insignificant relationship to the firm's performance. On the other hand, independent commissioners have positive impact to corporate transparency (Saiful et al., 2012) and financial reporting quality (Rusmin, 2011) . However, the definition of independent commissioner in the said researches simply follow the definition of 'independent' according to the Indonesian Stock Exchange regulations, that is an individual without any affiliation with management, other directors, controlling owners, and who does not serve as a commissioner in any other affiliated company (Prabowo & Simpson, 2011) . Whereas, in fact many independent commissioners who satisfy that criteria, have been employed or serving and holding positions in the company for many years thereby decreasing their level of independency.
In Indonesia, it is also common to find exgovernment officers serving in the board of commissioners. With their experience in the government, an ex-government officer is considered reputable to serve as a commissioner of the company. Schaede (1995) stated that 'the Old Boys' or a nickname for ex-government officers who serve as the board of directors in Japan, are able to smoothen the information flow between government and business, impact the formulation of corporate strategies in accordance to government regulations, and impact the formulation of public policies so that they effectively represent firm's and the private sector's interest. Unfortunately, research that examines ex-government officers existance and their relationship towards the firm's performance can barely be found in Indonesia.
Other board characteristics such as board size is also important as it relates to firm performance and prior research show varying results. Several studies in big public companies showed a negative relationship between board size and firm performance. This is true in US (Yermack, 1996) , Europe (Bennedsen, Kongsted, & Nielsen, 2008; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998) , and Asia (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005 ). Yet, studies on public companies in Indonesia showed that board size positively impact corporate transparency (Saiful et al., 2012) and the quality of earnings (Rusmin, 2011) .
A number of research has examined the board characteristics which will maximize firm value.
However, the results are inconclusive and dependent on each company's specific condition.
This research aims to understand the impact of certain composition (controlling shareholders, independent commissioners, and ex-government officer) of the board of commissioners to firm performance and the relationship between board -139 -Athalia Ariati Hidayat, of commissioners size and firm performance in Indonesia, which has two-tier board system.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The board of directors and board of commissioners are the central institution in the internal governance of the company (Lefort & Urzúa, 2008) . In the context of one- The board of commissioners have two main functions: (1) monitoring function, that can be related to agency theory; (2) providing resources function, that can be related to resource dependence theory. According to the agency theory, the board of commissioners hold the responsibility to monitor the management in the name of shareholders to avoid conflict of interest between principal and its agent (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Lefort & Urzúa, 2008) . Whereas according to resource dependence theory, the board of commissioners' role is to enhance the company's reputation, build external relations, and provide advice and consultation to management (Zahra & Pearce II, 1989) .
Most Indonesian companies have concentrated ownership and they are controlled by an individual or group of family members (Achmad, 2008; Husnan, 2001) . According to the agency theory, controlling shareholders or their representatives join the company's management with the intention to avoid agency costs that emerge from the different interests of owners and managers.
Agency problems can be minimized if the principal and agent are on the same side (Villalonga & Amit, 2006) , that is in the hands of family members.
While from the perspective of stewardship theory, a family director is considered to be able to monitor managers better and be a good asset protector, because the family's wealth is related to company assets (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) .
On the other hand, controlling shareholders' presence in management will increase the gap between voting rights and cash flow rights making it possible for the controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders' wealth (La Porta et al., 1999) . The separation between ownership and control can reduce firm value as another agency problem appears, that is between majority and minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000; Lins, 2003) . Hidayat and Loe (2011) found that the agency problem between majority and minority shareholders can trigger more critical problems for the company, as compared to the one caused by agency problems between owner and manager.
H1:
The proportion of controlling shareholders in the management (board of directors) has negative impact on firm performance.
If the controlling shareholder does not have the opportunity to be involved in the company management, they will take control as the commissioners of the company to monitor the management's work (Husnan, 2001) . The presence of controlling shareholders or his family members in the board of commissioners has positive relationship with firm performance, because of their intention to preserve their family reputation, wealth, and longterm firm performance (Wang, 2006) . Nevertheless, the presence of controlling shareholder or his family in the board of commissioners can also negatively impact corporate transparency, because family members tend to prevent management giving out too much information to the public and thus maintain the -140 -International Research Journal of Business Studies vol. VIII no. 03 (2015 -2016 advantage of keeping the information within the family (Saiful et al., 2012) . Prabowo and Simpson (2011) found that family members' involvement in the board of commissioners has a negative effect to firm performance since family members are a group of people with the same interest and can deter the effectiveness of internal control system.
H2:
The proportion of controlling shareholders in the board of commissioners has negative impact on firm performance.
To have a more independent view, the board of commissioners need an independent party that is not related to the controlling shareholder, that is the independent commissioner. According to the agency theory, an independent commissioner hold the responsibility to monitor insiders or the controlling shareholders, while according to the stewardship theory, an independent commissioner can provide valuable advice and counsel to the company (Anderson & Reeb, 2004) . Chugh et al., (2011) Ex-government officers who join the company's board of commissioners are expected to help in smoothing out the information flow between government and business, impact how corporate strategies are aligned with government regulations, and impact the formulation of public policies that can represent firms' interest (Schaede, 1995) .
Though, the politically connected firm generally has lower accounting performance than a firm without political connection (Boubakri et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010) . The involvement of ex-government officers in the board of commissioners can distract the company from profitability objectives to pursue political goals (Boubakri et al., 2008) , as external investors view the politically connected board as having low professionalism because of their irrelevant professional background (Fan et al., 2007) . Furthermore, a politically connected firm will devote less time and care managing quality disclosure due to the protection the politically connected firm enjoy, once the connection is established (Chaney et al., 2011) .
H4:
The proportion of ex-government officer in the board of commissioners has negative impact to firm performance.
The monitoring and advisory role of the board of commissioners can explain how the board of commissioners' size affect firm performance (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008) . Regarding the monitoring role, smaller boards are more effective at monitoring management (Coles et al., 2008) . This result aligns with prior studies that find board size has negative relationship with firm performance (Bennedsen et al., 2008; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Ujunwa, 2012; Yermack, 1996) . More complex coordination, communication, and decision making problems emerge with the increase in the number of board of commissioner members (Yermack, 1996) .
On the other hand, from the advisory role perspective, larger boards offer better advice to management (Coles et al., 2008) . This argument is supported by a study from Chugh et al. (2011) that suggest larger board size will create more opportunity and resources to the firm, increasing firm performance. Based on this contrasting -141 -Athalia Ariati Hidayat, results, we suggest there is a nonlinear relationship between the board of commissioners size and firm performance:
H5: Larger board size positively affects firm performance, but too large board size negatively affects firm performance.
METHODS

Data population on this research is all listed com-
panies in the Indonesian Stock Exchange. We limit the sample to companies which have audited financial statements and annual reports for a 5 year research period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) and have information on the board of commissioners and directors' profile, excluding companies in the financial industry because the financial industry has different characteristics (Darmadi, 2011) and the large possibility that financial companies are regulated, limiting the board of commissioners and directors' role (Yermack, 1996) . Sampling method is judmental sampling, with elimination of incomplete data. Table 1 shows the description of the sample. According to Hausman test, the most appropriate model to use is fixed-effects panel data regression. vol. VIII no. 03 (2015 vol. VIII no. 03 ( -2016 the 
Model 1
Q it = β 0it + β 1 FAMBOC it + β 2 FAMBOD it + β 3 INDCOM it + β 4 EXGOVOFF it +β 5 BSIZE it + β 6 BSIZE2 it + β 7 SIZE it + β 8 DEBT it + β 9 AGE it + β 10 GROW it + β 11 RISK it +e it Model 2 ROA it = β 0it + β 1 FAMBOC it + β 2 FAMBOD it + β 3 INDCOM it + β 4 EXGOVOFF it +β 5 BSIZE it + β 6 BSIZE2 it + β 7 SIZE it + β 8 DEBT it + β 9 AGE it + β 10 GROW it + β 11 RISK it
Board Characteristics Variable
The proportion of controlling shareholders in the board of commissioners and board of directors is determined by the proportion of board members that have family relationship (Saiful et al., 2012) .
This research will be searching for common surnames in board members to identify family relationship (Tabalujan, 2002) , except when there is strong evidence that someone is connected either vertically or horizontally to the family. The or as a government organization head. This follows the definition from previous researches (Fan et al., 2007; Goldman et al., 2009; Lester et al., 2008) , adjusted to the condition in Indonesia.
In addition, this research will also see the effect of the proportion of current government officers only (GOVOFF) and the proportion of ex-government officers and current government officers combined (ALLGOVOFF), to firm performance.
Following prior research (Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Rusmin, 2011; Saiful et al., 2012; Yermack, 1996) , the board of commissioners size is determined from the total number of members in the board of commissioners. Table 2 show the description for all variables used in the research. vol. VIII no. 03 (2015 vol. VIII no. 03 ( -2016 in the research. There are 867 observations in this study, from 293 firm samples.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
According to table 4, This result agree with Anderson and Reeb (2003) , Barontini and Caprio (2006) , and also Villalonga and Amit (2006) vol. VIII no. 03 (2015 vol. VIII no. 03 ( -2016 effect. The family commissioners are expected to be able to enhance the role in controlling directors, which is one of their main responsibilities. Wang (2) board of commissioners has no impact to firm performance.
The The other possibility is because an ex-government officer has indirect effect to firm performance.
According to Fan et al. (2007) and Fisman (2001), a politically connected firm has lower stock return.
Besides, a politically connected firm has higher debt level (Faccio, 2010; Khwaja & Mian, 2005) and lower earnings and financial reporting quality (Chaney et al., 2011) to government officer (current or ex-) have no effect to firm performance.
As we can see from 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
As stated in Lefort and Urzua (2008) However, these two variables have no significant -152 -International Research Journal of Business Studies vol. VIII no. 03 (2015 -2016 impact on the performance of accounting firms (ROA).
Significant positive correlation was also found in the proportion of independent commissioners to the value of Tobin's Q and ROA, with higher levels of significance in ROA. The independent commissioner is deemed to protect the interests of the minority shareholders from expropriation of wealth that may be done by the majority shareholders. Furthermore, we found that independent commissioners who have served for less than 9 years and was not a former employee of the company, have a positive association with a higher level of significance to the Tobin's Q. These results indicate that after serving for more than 9 years or were once the company's employees, independent commissioners can no longer be considered as independent parties.
Yet, independent commissioners who were former employees in a business group and, have highly significant positive result to Tobin's Q and ROA. This means that they can be considered a fairly independent party yet they have enough knowledge about the company so they are able to supervise competently.
The For further research, we suggest that the researcher investigates more about the independent commissioner who is an employee or management of other companies within a business group. It is because this group contributed most to the significant positive results in the relationship between the proportion of independent commissioners and firm performance. In addition, we also suggest defining more categories for government officials to determine the effect of each of these categories on the performance of the company.
